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Abstract 
This research empirically examines whether or not there is a political business cycle in 
Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. First, an overview of the research on political 
business cycles that has come before this is undertaken. Following this, a research 
method is proposed and results of this research are described. Analysis of the data 
revealed that there is weak evidence for the existence of a political business cycle in 
Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. Additionally, conclusions are drawn with 
regards to the relation between employment and election years, as well as what 
constitute visible expenditures. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 The idea of a political business cycle is not new. It was first described in detail 
and brought to popular attention by Nordhaus in 1975. However, the idea behind it is 
reasonably obvious and has probably existed for as long as elections have. The idea 
behind the political business cycle is, in its most basic form, as follows. Politicians want 
to get re-elected. The re-election of politicians depends largely on economic conditions. 
Politicians have at least some control over economic conditions. From this situation, 
which occurs in every democracy around the world, it is not too much of a stretch to 
assume that in some places, some politicians will seek to use their influence to 
manipulate the economy to maximize their chances of re-election (Schultz, 1995, 79). 
  The most famous example of a political business cycle comes from the 1972 
United States Presidential election. In this election, the incumbent, Richard Nixon, was 
justifiably seen to be engaging in significant pre-electoral manipulation of the economy 
(Drazen, 2000, 75). This situation is regarded by some commentators as being a 
catalyst for research into the topic (Drazen, 2000, 75). As Nordhaus’ influential work 
which would go onto stimulate much more research into the topic was published in 1975, 
this seems quite possible. 
 However, despite the above example and many others like it, the theory and 
study of political business cycles owe more to the intuitive plausibility of the issue rather 
than to its empirical track record (Schultz, 1995, 79). Nordhaus’ work was able to lay the 
theoretical groundwork for the issue, however, the empirical results from Nordhaus’ 
study showed that empirically finding evidence of political business cycles may be more 
difficult than initially thought. Much of the research that followed led to similar 
conclusions.  
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There are many theoretical arguments for why political business cycles do exist 
or why they should exist. However, empirically finding evidence of political business 
cycles has proven to be quite difficult (Drazen, 2000, 76). A number of reasons for this 
will be suggested later. However, the state of the research on political business cycles is 
as follows. There is much academic support for the theory that underlies political 
business cycles. That is not to say that everyone agrees on every detail of the theories, 
just that there is relative agreement about why political business cycles occur. However, 
on whether or not political business cycles exist empirically, and to what extent they exist 
if they do, there is much less agreement (Drazen, 2000, 76). Many studies into the 
empirics of the political business cycle find that there is little to no evidence that political 
business cycles actually exist. However, there is also research that suggests that 
political business cycles do exist on somewhat of a wide scale. 
This research project was designed in this context. The theory underpinning 
political business cycles is relatively established. However, whether or not they exist is 
open to much debate. This research seeks to examine the latter within the limited 
context of Ontario municipalities. 
The purpose of this research is to attempt to replicate the results of a study by 
Veiga & Veiga which was published in 2007. The study examines all mainland 
Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2001 and found strong evidence to support the 
notion that political business cycles exist and are influential at the local level, at least in 
Portugal. This study was chosen for a number of reasons. It is a recent study. As well, it 
features strong findings on the issue. Finally, the methodology of the study seemed to be 
well developed and thoughtful. For these reasons it seemed appropriate to use the study 
by Veiga & Veiga as a base for this research. 
There are many implications that follow from the existence of political business 
cycles. The existence of political business cycles may lead to inefficiencies in the 
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economy (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63). As well, the existence of political business cycles 
undercuts democracy as the electorate is manipulated by politicians. With such serious 
consequences, whether or not political business cycles exist in any democratic context is 
an important question. 
 This research will study whether or not there is empirical evidence of political 
business cycles in Ontario municipalities with populations over 20,000 over the time 
period of 2000 to 2006. The limited scope of this study, in comparison to the study it will 
attempt to replicate the results of, is due to a number of factors including limited data, 
the difference in context between Portugal and Ontario, and the limited research 
capacity of those involved with this project. 
 The rest of this paper will be organized as follows. The following chapter reviews 
scholarly literature. As well, a number of previous studies into the empirics of the political 
business cycle will be reviewed. In the third chapter the research design of this study will 
be presented, and a number of hypotheses will be put forward. The fourth chapter will 
present the results of the research. The fifth chapter will briefly discuss some of the 
limitations of the results. The sixth chapter will be an analysis of the results. Finally, the 
seventh chapter will overview implications for the theory of the political business cycle 
that arise from this research, and opportunities for future research will be discussed. 
 This research project comes to the conclusion that there is some empirical 
evidence for the existence of a political business cycle in Ontario municipalities. The 
evidence is not overpowering, however, it also is not insignificant. 
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Chapter Two - Literature Review 
 The academic study of political business cycles was initiated by Nordhaus with 
his 1975 article entitled “The Political Business Cycle.” In the original model, national 
governments use monetary policy to improve their chances of re-election by making an 
employment/inflation trade-off. Specifically, leading up to an election expansionary 
monetary policy is used to produce a pre-election boom, of which one result is lower 
unemployment. The inflationary consequences of these actions are not felt until after the 
election (Nordhaus, 1975, 184). Nordhaus’ model was highly influential in setting the 
stage for early research into the issue of political business cycles. However, there were 
a number of issues with his model which soon became problematic. 
 Nordhaus’ model relied on voters who were repeatedly tricked again as their 
expectations regarding inflation were wholly past-looking. Voters in his model did not 
anticipate the future at all. The presence of a public who had experienced political 
business cycles before and would not anticipate future inflation to rise in the face of high 
current expenditures led to criticisms of irrationality (Drazen, 2000, 80). Since its initial 
formulation, the theory behind political business cycles has become well grounded in 
micro-economic theory, and has dispensed with irrationality. The explanations for 
political business cycles that are driven by monetary policy manipulations have largely 
been discredited (Drazen, 2000, 95). However, the theory is alive and well and now 
focuses on fiscal policy manipulations (in some cases along with monetary policy 
manipulations) in an environment where irrationality is not an option (Baleiras & Santos, 
2000, 122; Drazen, 2000, 96). As a result, the current theoretical models that argue that 
political business cycles will be created by politicians in democratic systems now have 
much explanatory power and form a strong ground for empirical research into the 
subject. 
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 The theory behind the political business cycle is that politicians, seeking to 
maximize their chances of re-election, strategically manipulate the public economy 
(Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46). How politicians are said to influence the economy depends 
on what level of government is being studied, as this theory can be applied to national, 
regional, or local governments.1 At the local level the manipulations can involve 
incumbent politicians lowering taxes, raising expenditures, and manipulating the 
composition of expenditures. In the manipulations, highly visible forms of expenditures 
are preferred (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46; Sakurai & Menezes-Filho, 2008, 310). Capital 
expenditures are more easily varied than operational expenditures and thus there should 
be more variation in capital expenditures. Specifically, highly visible investment 
expenditures such as streets and complementary works are relevant to political business 
cycles (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 46). The election year represents the most opportune time 
for increased spending or decreased taxes as the length of time that most voters 
recollect is short (Drazen, 2000, 82). Finally, it is argued that political business cycles 
are more likely to succeed in less advanced democracies as the electorate will be less 
likely to understand what is occurring (Drazen, 2000, 96). However, there is also reason 
to suspect that some democratic experience is required to have politicians that are 
capable of forming political business cycles. 
What drives the politicians to create political business cycles? 
Since the original research on political business cycles, there have been many 
investigations that look at the theory and motivations that drive political business cycles. 
Many of these are evaluations of the behaviour of politicians. While some studies argue 
that the motivating force of politicians is simply to be re-elected, more recent studies 
                                                          
1 As the focus of this study is on local governments, the majority of arguments and examples provided will 
revolve around local governments. However, as the theory was developed largely looking at national 
governments some examples from the national level will be used. As the local level is the level of chief 
concern here, when it is mentioned that politicians can influence the economy, at the local level this 
refers to the local public economy. 
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have argued that politicians have a utility function2 that relies on not only their probability 
of re-election, but also what their utility will be if they do not get re-elected (Baleiras & 
Santos, 2000, 123). Every analysis of the motivating factors of political business cycles 
concludes that politicians in democratic systems have an incentive to spend more in the 
current period (that is the period before the next election). That theoretical examinations 
into the issue predict that there should be empirical results is very important. In the 
absence of a strong theory, empirical evidence that supports the existence of a political 
business cycle would be less convincing. This is because in the absence of established 
theory, alternative explanations for the existence of political business cycles may prove 
more convincing. However, the theory behind political business cycles is established and 
provides a strong base for empirical research into the subject. Understanding the theory 
is essential to understanding empirical research. There are a number of important 
factors that drive the theoretical result that politicians will engage in the creation of 
political business cycles. 
 The most often mentioned, and easiest to understand, is that politicians will 
discount the utility that they gain from the period that they spend in office after their re-
election by the chances that they are re-elected (Martinez, 2009, 1175). The intuition 
behind this is simple. Politicians care less about what they can do in office if they are re-
elected because they do not know that they will be re-elected.  
 The other two driving forces of the result that politicians will engage in the 
creation of a political business cycle are effort smoothing and experience gained on the 
job (Martinez, 2009, 1175 and 1167). The latter is important for the following reason. The 
best indicator for the future performance of a politician is their past performance. Their 
current performance is a better indicator than performance in the more distant past, as 
                                                          
2 A utility function is basically a formula that is used to measure the satisfaction level of a given person. 
Utility basically equals satisfaction.  
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politicians, like all employees, gain experience as they work their jobs. Thus, current 
performance is a more accurate indicator of future performance than is performance in 
the more distant past (Martinez, 2009, 1175). This is one of the reasons why the public 
can be tricked by politicians. 
 The argument regarding effort smoothing is more complicated and the 
implications regarding this will not be presented in detail here. However, a quick 
comparison will be made between politicians seeking re-election and the motivations of 
a tenure-track professor whose contract has come up for renewal, that will present some 
of the implications that result from effort smoothing. 
 Tenure-track positions have been shown to suffer from renegotiation cycles. A 
renegotiation cycle occurs when performance improves the year before the signing of a 
new multi-year contract, and declines after the contract is signed. Consider a tenure-
track professor who begins with an average reputation. The optimal strategy for this 
professor is to choose an intermediate level of effort early in the term of their contract. 
When the renegotiation period nears the professor then observes their current 
reputation. If their reputation is still average then it is optimal for them to exert more 
effort. However, if their current reputation is very high or very low then a lower effort level 
should be chosen (Martinez, 2009, 1167). This example shows how effort smoothing can 
lead to cycles in performance. 
 The argument regarding consumption smoothing, while complicated, is important 
as it can be used to derive the result that politicians will create political business cycles 
even if they do not discount post-election utilities and if the ability of politicians does not 
grow over time (Martinez, 2009, 1175). This is important as the discounting argument 
may not be true of all politicians. As well, the idea that the ability of politicians develops 
over time, while intuitively plausible, depends on what the functions of politicians are 
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considered, and to what extent they could develop their skills with regards to those 
functions. 
 This section provides a number of arguments why politicians would create 
political business cycles. Some of the explanations revolve around selfish politicians who 
wish to simply maximize their own welfare. These explanations point to a more sinister 
and calculating cause of political business cycles. However, other explanations, such as 
the one which argues that increased experience plays a role, are more passive in their 
assertions into what drives political business cycles.  
Does the economy matter to voting? 
The theory behind the political business cycle entails that voters view seemingly 
better economic conditions, at least their own personal economic conditions, and that 
these conditions play an influential role in the determination of who the public will vote 
for (Johnston, 1999, 517; Drazen, 2000, 82). The political business cycle strongly relies 
on this occurring as if the public either does not notice economic conditions, or does not 
vote based on them, then political business cycle theory does not make sense. 
However, not only does the idea that the economy plays a role in elections intuitively 
make sense as one of the main functions of government is to regulate the economy and 
their performance should thus be judged at least partially on its ability to fulfill that role, 
but it has been shown empirically. Many studies have confirmed the importance of 
economic conditions in voting (Johnston, 1999, 517 for the Canadian context, Drazen, 
2000, 82, recommends Kramer, 1971, Tufte, 1974, and Fair, 1978 for the American 
context).  
 Political business cycle theory also relies on the fact that voters care more about 
what politicians do at the end of their term (Drazen, 2000, 83). If this was not true then 
election year manipulations would have less of an effect than is proposed by those who 
argue that the political business cycle exists. However, the importance of recent events 
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has been shown empirically (Drazen, 2000, 83, recommends Fair, 1978). This result 
also intuitively makes sense as many people do not follow politics very closely on a 
regular basis, but will be exposed to more political information in the period leading up to 
an election. 
How can voters repeatedly being tricked be rational? 
One of the most common criticisms of political business cycle theory is that for it 
to be true, voters must repeatedly fall for the same trick. This criticism was highly 
problematic in the early stages of the development of political business cycle theory, and 
remains an important issue. However, while voters repeatedly being tricked may be 
perceived by some as irrational, explanations have been developed for how voters can 
be repeatedly tricked, while remaining rational. 
 The main factor at play is information asymmetry (Baleiras & Santos, 2000, 121). 
Included in this is voter’s rational ignorance (Baleiras & Santos, 2000, 121). At the local 
government level, the efficient provision of basic services is a principal activity. Thus, the 
notion of productivity in the public sector stresses the administrative skills of the policy 
maker. A situation in which taxes are fixed or decreasing with higher levels of spending 
could be seen as a sign of greater competency3 (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 49). This is 
especially true where municipal output or performance figures are hard to find. Taxes 
and spending are often the best available information to the public (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 
50). Even if a member of the public wants to become informed it can be quite difficult to 
do. For these reasons it is hard to blame those who base their vote on simple indicators, 
for example lower taxes and more visible spending in areas that concern them.  
 That voters would be susceptible to manipulations in election years is also not 
entirely surprising. As stated above, it seems likely that many people receive a high 
proportion of their political news in election years. Also, if voters are going to examine 
                                                          
3 This situation is made possible by the ability to use reserves or to accumulate capital deficits.  
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the government’s record en masse, this would be most likely to occur in election years. 
This, combined with the argument that the best indicator of future performance is 
current, not past, performance, indicates that it should not be that surprising that voters 
are more susceptible to manipulations in election years. 
 A final factor at play in election year fiscal manipulations is transfers to specific 
groups or constituencies (Drazen, 2000, 101). This kind of politics, while potentially 
being seen as politicians satisfying their constituencies, is also akin to bribery if the 
motivation of the politician is purely re-election. However, there is reason to suspect that 
election year manipulation of this kind occurs, either as a result of increased focus on 
politics and what can be gained on the part of constituencies, or by increased focus on 
constituencies by politicians. 
 There are a number of reasons that have been presented which show that voters 
can be rational, while still falling victim to the same manipulations over and over again. 
Most of the explanations revolve around the fact that voters do not have useful 
information on who they are voting for, and as a result are forced to use indicators that 
are easily manipulated. 
Additional theoretical issues 
 While most of the above has argued that there are many factors that are enabling 
political business cycles to be created, there are some factors that limit the scope or size 
of political business cycles. First, these manipulations are not expected in every locality 
for every election. Indeed, there are potential costs for a politician creating a political 
business cycle. These costs involve either being caught directly manipulating the 
economy for one’s own personal gain (certainly not a good situation for any politician), or 
manipulating the economy in a harmful way so that one develops a reputation as a bad 
manager of the economy (also a bad situation for any politician to be in). Thus, there 
exist costs to enacting policies that will create political business cycles (Schultz, 1995, 
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85). It can therefore be expected that only politicians in close races will choose to 
attempt to opportunistically manipulate the economy (Schultz, 1995, 87). This can lead 
to issues in attempting to empirically find a political business cycle. The relationship 
between election years, taxes, and expenditures may rely on whether the election will be 
closely fought.  
If this is true, then whether or not an election will be close must be known far in 
advance of the election. Whether or not an election will be close is not always known far 
in advance, and some of the policies that are used to create political business cycles 
must be enacted well in advance of an election. This implies that either politicians who 
are not completely sure of their positions may attempt to create a political business 
cycle, or that many politicians will not know whether or not they will be popular and so 
refrain from opportunistic tactics. 
 Another issue with political business cycles is that they involve both lowering 
taxes and raising spending before an election, and raising taxes and lowering spending 
after an election to offset the cost of the opportunistic policies. However, creating 
spending and lowering taxes is usually more politically acceptable then eliminating 
spending and raising taxes, both of which can alienate some of the electorate (Schultz, 
1995, 87). 
There is another way in which political business cycles may operate. It is 
possible that taxes are lowered and expenditures are raised in election years, and that 
there is no corresponding increase or decrease after the elections. In the absence of 
countering effects in non-election years, the long-run effect of this type of political 
business cycle would be increased spending and lower taxes.  
 A final note is that a number of other factors have been suggested as affecting 
the relationship between elections, spending, and taxes. Whether or not the incumbent 
candidate is running for re-election should change their motivations; however the 
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empirics of this are less clear then would be imagined (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63). As 
well, ideology has been suggested as having an effect on how opportunistic politicians 
seek to gain electoral advantage. Specifically it is suggested that left-wing incumbents 
have greater incentives to create political business cycles (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 63), 
although again the empirics of this are debatable. 
Literature Review (Empirics) 
 Many studies have been performed that attempt to analyse whether there is 
empirical support for the political business cycle. These studies have been performed 
across and within nations, over all levels of government. The results of these empirical 
analyses are highly mixed. A number of previous findings will be discussed to give some 
context to the present research that will then be discussed. 
 One recent and particularly well developed study was conducted by Veiga & 
Veiga (2007). They found that there was clear evidence of rational opportunistic 
behaviour by mayors in Portugal over the time period of 1979-2001. This included a 
10.5% decrease in taxes in election years and a 4% increase in total expenditures, with 
an 8.2% rise in investment expenditures. As well, it was concluded that left-wing mayors 
were more opportunistic. The dependent variables analysed were budget balances, total 
municipal taxes per capita, and real per capita expenditures broken down into a number 
of sub-groupings. The explanatory variables were lagged values of the dependent 
variables, total real per capita transfers, an election year dummy variable, and an 
ideological dummy variable. The controlling factors were the percentage of the 
population under 15 and over 65, population density, a dummy variable that deals with 
proximity to the coastline, and a population category that dealt with city size. This study 
and its methodology form the basis for this research, however, it had to be tweaked in 
quite a number of ways to make it more applicable to the Ontario case. A related study 
by Coelho, Veiga, & Veiga (2006) found employment increases in election years and 
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pre-election years relative to others. That the mayor was running for re-election was 
crucial to the result. These studies point out a number of factors recognized in the theory 
behind political business cycle, notably that running for re-election can be significant. As 
well, that the result was obtained that political business cycles existed is consistent with 
other results which indicate that they are more likely to exist in newer democracies.4 
 Akhemedov & Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral manipulation increased 
the chance of re-election in Russia. As well, Sakurai & Menezes-Filho (2008) find that 
higher spending leads to greater chances of re-election in Brazil, as did higher 
opportunistic spending. Gonzalez (1999b) surveys 43 countries and finds that political 
business cycles affect countries with intermediate levels of democracy most (Drazen, 
2000, 98). Shi and Svensson (2000) examine 123 countries and come to the conclusion 
that political business cycles are especially strong in developing countries (Drazen, 
2000, 98). 
 Blais & Nadeau (1992) examined Canadian provinces from 1951-84 and found 
evidence for a short-electoral cycle, only in the year before elections (that is there is no 
corresponding tax increase in the year after elections), and mainly in social services and 
roads (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 48). 
 In his seminal article on the issue, Nordhaus (1975) finds empirical evidence for 
political business cycles at the federal level in Germany, New Zealand, and the United 
States, while not finding any evidence with regards to Canada, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand. He also finds modest evidence for political business cycles in France and 
Sweden. 
 Ginsburgh & Michel (1983) argue that political business cycles are more likely to 
occur where there are fixed election dates, and that they are more likely to be detected 
with fixed election dates. The endogenous nature of non-fixed elections not only reduces 
                                                          
4 Portugal had been governed by a military-civilian provisional administration as recently as 1976. 
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the incentives that politicians have to engage in the creation of political business cycles, 
it also makes detecting political business cycles where they do exist more difficult.  
Drazen (2000) is highly critical of models that rely solely on monetary policy explanations 
and finds that fiscal policy is a more informative avenue for study. Schultz (1995) 
confirms that governments who are far ahead in the polls will not engage in manipulation 
while those in close races are more likely to do so.  
 The preceding section has highlighted some of the empirical research into 
political business cycles. However, this section has focused on research that has 
resulted in findings of political business cycles. The purpose of this was to illustrate what 
can be looked for, and what has been successfully found regarding the political business 
cycle. This section should not mislead any readers into thinking that most research into 
political business cycles finds associations between relevant variables and election 
years, as this is certainly not the case.   
 In summation, the state of the research is mixed. There is a solid theoretical 
foundation for research on political business cycles that suggests valid reasons why they 
might occur and what that process might operate like. However, empirical results have 
been mixed with results coming from developing countries being more likely to have 
found evidence of political business cycles. 
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Chapter Three - Research Design 
 The research design of this project will be adapted from that of the Veiga & Veiga 
(2007) study to suit the Ontario municipal context. As well, the scale of the project was 
reduced to accommodate the data available, as well as the research capacity of those 
involved with the project. 
Why study Ontario municipal government? 
 There are a number of features of municipal government which make the study 
of political business cycles uniquely suitable to that level of government. Where 
municipalities are forced to or choose to record financial information in detail and make 
that information available to the public, there exists data that cannot be found at other 
levels of government. This is because the institutional structure and policy instruments 
available at the municipal level are constant across regions or countries. As well, the 
number of localities within a given region provides many cases to compare (Veiga & 
Veiga, 2007, 46). 
For example, to study municipalities within Ontario, there exist data sets that 
include 444 municipalities. In contrast, there exist only 10 provinces in Canada which 
could be studied. The analysis could be extended across countries, for example studying 
Canadian provinces and American states. However the institutional structure and policy 
instruments available to provinces are different from those available to states and this 
can lead to issues in analysis. 
Ontario municipalities also have fixed election dates. The presence of fixed 
election dates increases both the chances of political business cycles occurring, as well 
as the chances of research detecting political business cycles (Ginsburgh & Michel, 
1983, 156). Fixed election dates have this effect because they make politicians certain 
that an election will occur at a given time. This means that if they wish to enact policies 
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that will result in a political business cycle, then they can do so knowing exactly when 
they must enact those policies to achieve the desired result. The vagueness associated 
with non-fixed election dates injects uncertainty into the process which diminishes the 
returns that a given politician could expect from policies that cause a political business 
cycle. Similarly, the endogenous nature of non-fixed election dates injects more 
uncertainty into the empirical study of political business cycles (Ginsburgh & Michel, 
1983, 156). 
Canada is a democracy, and all levels of government within Canada have 
democratic elections. Ontario municipalities, like most around the world, promote social 
and economic development by organizing and supplying public goods. Also importantly, 
municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own employees and assets, 
and they define their local budget. However, Ontario’s municipalities are not completely 
autonomous. They are creations of the Ontario government and are subject to many 
rules and regulations that are imposed upon them. This can limit their access to revenue 
as well as their expenditure choices. However, on the whole Ontario’s municipalities are 
fairly autonomous and there certainly exists the potential for political business cycles to 
be created within them (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 48, sets out similar criteria for Portuguese 
municipalities). 
Hypotheses 
 The research question that this project seeks to answer is: Is there a political 
business cycle in Ontario municipalities? Stemming from this as well as the theory 
above, a number of hypotheses have been developed that will be tested. The main 
hypothesis is that taxes, capital spending, and municipal employment will be significantly 
related to election year. 
 It must be noted that the relationship, while significant, is not hypothesized to be 
extremely significant, and in fact there were many reasons to suspect that the results 
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obtained by this study may not be significant at all. As stated previously, the expectation 
with political business cycles is not that they will occur in every municipality for every 
election. As such, the relationship that is being searched for is not one that will hold in all 
cases. This can lead to issues in finding empirical results that support a political 
business cycle. 
Hypotheses can be made not just on whether or not there will be a relationship 
between the variables named and election year, but also what direction that relationship 
will be in. It is hypothesized that taxes will be negatively related to election year. Political 
business cycle theory proposes that politicians allow for lower taxes relative to other 
years in election years to build support amongst the public.  
 It is hypothesized that capital expenditures and municipal employment will be 
positively related with election year. For employment this relationship is also 
hypothesized for the year before elections. The theory behind this hypothesis is that 
capital expenditures and employment, particularly in highly visible areas, will go up in 
election years as politicians attempt to make themselves appear more competent or as 
politicians support key constituencies.  
Methodology 
 The top 70 municipalities in Ontario by population excluding upper-tier entities 
were studied. This accounts for roughly all of the municipalities that are over 20,000 in 
population. This sample was chosen for a number of reasons. 
 Firstly, there are reasons to suspect that the politics of small municipalities will be 
substantially different from that of larger municipalities. One way in which this is the case 
is that in smaller municipalities one large expenditure item might lead to a large variation 
in expenditures. Secondly, this sample size was chosen to allow for the research to take 
place in a timely fashion. Finally, this sample size represents over 15% of the total 
municipal population. While this is not a large percentage of the municipal population, 
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these municipalities do make up a large percentage of the total Ontario population. In 
the year 2006, the top 70 municipalities in Ontario by population contained 10,426,724 
people. This represents over 82 percent of the 12,665,300 people in Ontario (Statistics 
Canada, 2009).  
This represents a reasonable sample size. Also, for statistical purposes with a 
population size of 500, to achieve analysis with a confidence level of 95% 19 times out 
of 20, a sample size of 78 is required (O`Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008, 171). The 
sample selected is large enough for meaningful statistical analysis to be conducted, and 
did not result in numerous delays as might have occurred with a larger sample size. 
 The following data was collected for the top 70 lower or single-tier municipalities 
by population for the years 2000 to 20065: total municipal employment, including sub-
sections for full-time, part-time, and seasonal; total own purpose lower-tier taxation; 
capital expenditures including sub-sections for protection services, recreation and 
culture, transportation, and planning and development; provincial unconditional grants, 
provincial conditional grants, and federal conditional grants; population density; the 
percentage of people under age 15 and over age 65; and Ontario unemployment and 
employment rates.  All financial data and employment data were converted into per 
capita measures. As well, all financial information was converted into real figures using 
the base-year 2000, using an inflation calculator made available by the Bank of Canada 
(Bank of Canada, 2010). Annual percentage changes were also calculated for all 
variables where possible. 
All data was obtained from the Ontario Financial Information Return / Municipal 
Performance Measurement Program website, with the exception of the percentages of 
population under 15 and over 65, as well as population density which were obtained 
from Statistics Canada community profiles. As these were only available for census 
                                                          
5 For reasons as to why certain variables were selected, see the section entitled “Measurement.” 
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years, the 2006 figures were used as they are most recent and relevant to this research. 
The Ontario employment percentages were obtained from Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada. With the exception of the Statistics Canada data, all data was 
gathered where available for all of the relevant years. 
The time frame was chosen for a number of reasons. The Ontario Financial 
Information Return / Municipal Performance Measurement Program data that was so 
crucial to this project is available starting for the year 2000. The year 2006 was chosen 
as an end date as when the project was initially designed that was the last election year 
for which there was data. This time frame contains three election years (2000, 2003, 
2006) and four non-election years (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005). This gives adequate data 
on numerous election and non-election years, and makes sure that data from one year is 
not being given a disproportionate amount of weight as could be possible if only one 
election year was chosen. As well, similarly to why the top 70 municipalities by 
population were chosen as the sample, the years selected allowed for data collection to 
proceed in a timely fashion and the sample size was deemed large enough to conduct 
meaningful statistical analysis. 
Measurement 
 The following regressions are used in this analysis: 
Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita = Election year + Real Canada 
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real 
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 + 
% population under 15 
 
Real capital expenditures per capita = Election year + Real Canada conditional grants 
per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real Ontario 
conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 + % 
population under 15 
 
Real capital expenditures per capita: recreation and culture = Election year + Real 
Canada conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per 
capita + Real Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % 
population over 65 + % population under 15 
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Real capital expenditures per capita: planning and development = Election year + Real 
Canada conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per 
capita + Real Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % 
population over 65 + % population under 15 
 
Real capital expenditures per capita: transportation = Election year + Real Canada 
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real 
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 + 
% population under 15 
 
Real capital expenditures per capita: protection = Election year + Real Canada 
conditional grants per capita + Real Ontario unconditional grants per capita + Real 
Ontario conditional grants per capita + population density + % population over 65 + 
% population under 15 
 
Municipal employment per capita = Election year + Year before election year + 
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario 
unemployment rate 
 
Municipal employment per capita: part-time = Election year + Year before election year + 
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario 
unemployment rate 
 
Municipal employment per capita: seasonal = Election year + Year before election year + 
population density + % population over 65 + % population under 15 + Ontario 
unemployment rate 
 
 The above regressions will allow for all of the proposed hypotheses to be tested. 
The reasons for choosing the variables that were chosen will now be given. 
 For the taxation variable, real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita was 
chosen for a number of reasons. Alternative variables include total taxation not strictly at 
the lower-tier level or for own purposes, or municipal residential tax rate. The total 
taxation variable was not chosen as this could lead to debate as to which tier of 
government was responsible for the tax, and to what extent local councillors would be 
able to change the tax if they wanted to. These confounding factors would make the 
analysis less clear. Using own purpose and lower-tier taxation only, the chances that 
local politicians will be able to control these variables, and thus create a political 
business cycle is raised. Municipal tax rates were not chosen as a variable as the tax 
rates depend crucially on the assessment values of property within the municipality. As 
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this research is not intending to examine any effects that are caused by changes in 
assessed values of property this variable did not seem reasonable. As well, it seems 
legitimate to assume that local voters care more about the actual amount of property tax 
that they are paying rather than the exact rate which they are paying.  
 Real capital expenditures per capita are being examined as political business 
cycle theory predicts that politicians will spend additional funds in areas where high 
amounts of variation are more possible, and in highly visible areas (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 
48). Thus, operating expenditures are not an item that political business cycle theory 
predicts will be manipulated by politicians leading up to elections (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 
50; Beleiras & da Silva Costa, 2004, 657). The reasons for this have been touched on 
but are worth repeating. Operation expenditures are largely composed of things like 
salaries which are governed by unionized labour contracts which are exceedingly difficult 
to change or manipulate (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 50; Beleiras & da Silva Costa, 2004, 
657). As well, many operational expenses could not be classified as visible 
expenditures. A final note on operational expenditures is that they must be paid for in the 
time period in which they are consumed. This is not true of capital expenditures and is 
yet another reason why capital expenditures are easier to manipulate.  
Capital expenditures as a whole are considered to be more variable and more 
visible than operational expenditures (Veiga & Veiga, 2007, 50). As well, with all capital 
expenditures the possibility exists that the expenditure is being made to satisfy a specific 
constituency. As discussed above, if these expenditures are made by politicians strictly 
because they wish to keep their jobs then these expenditures would be akin to bribery. 
Political business cycle theory predicts that capital expenditures may be manipulated by 
politicians as elections grow closer. 
 While capital expenditures as a whole could be expected to be manipulated, 
there are many capital expenditures which could not be considered visible. For this 
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reason the capital expenditure variable has been disaggregated into several sub-
categories which provide more specific measures for testing the existence of political 
business cycles. These sub-categories are recreation and culture, planning and 
development, transportation, and protection.  
 Capital expenditures in protection would be visible in a municipality where crime 
was to be a large election issue. As this analysis examines the larger municipalities in 
Ontario and as crime is often perceived to be a problem in urban areas, expenditures on 
protection could be considered visible. Planning and development, as well as 
transportation, are visible expenditures because citizens inevitably run into these capital 
projects in their daily life in a municipality. Construction tends to be highly visible, 
especially to people who have long commutes or live in highly urban areas (Spafford, 
1981, 135). Finally, recreation and cultural expenses allow for politicians to satisfy 
certain constituencies in highly visible ways. For these reasons, these variables are 
important to examine in the context of political business cycles. 
 There is evidence political business cycles are possible in municipal employment 
(Coelho, Veiga, & Veiga, 2006, 86). For this reason it was important to study the 
employment variables. While it is possible that total municipal employment would 
change, it seemed more likely that part-time or seasonal employment would be easier to 
manipulate. This is due to the restrictive union contracts that municipalities face. As 
more variation is expected in part-time and seasonal employees, these variables were 
important to study. 
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Chapter Four - Results 
 Linear regressions were performed on all of the data mentioned above. The 
results indicate that the hypotheses are partially confirmed. For most variables the 
regression coefficient was the expected sign; however, in most cases the results were 
not significant at the 5% level. For theories on why the following results were obtained 
see the chapter entitled “Analysis.” 
 Before the results of the regressions are discussed, a cursory examination of the 
data pulled a number of interesting issues that seem to point towards the existence of 
political business cycles. 27 of the 30 largest negative annual changes in real own 
purpose taxation occurred in 2006. Five of the 30 largest positive changes in this 
variable occurred in election years. Of the 30 largest positive changes in capital 
expenditures, 15 occurred in election years. However, of the 30 largest negative 
changes in that variable, 10 occurred in election years. Of the 30 largest values for part-
time municipal employees, 22 come from years before election years. 20 of the top 30 
values for seasonal employment also come from years before election years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table One: Summary of Regression Results  
Variable (all 
real and per 
capita, where 
applicable) 
Adj. 
R2 
Election 
year 
coefficient 
Year 
before 
election 
coefficient 
t-value: 
election 
year 
t-value: 
year 
before 
election 
Sig.: 
election 
year 
Sig.: 
year 
before 
elec. 
Own purpose 
lower-tier 
taxation 
.607 -23.842 N/A -1.603 N/A .11 N/A 
Capital 
expenditure 
.140 8.795 N/A .565 N/A .573 N/A 
Transportation 
capital 
expenditure 
.104 7.798 N/A 1.432 N/A .153 N/A 
Recreation and 
culture capital 
expenditure 
.059 6.116 N/A .840 N/A .401 N/A 
Protection 
services 
capital 
expenditure 
.035 1.869 N/A 1.205 N/A .229 N/A 
Planning and 
development 
capital 
expenditure 
.025 -0.727 N/A -.268 N/A .789 N/A 
Employment - 
Total 
.245 See 
appendix 6 
See 
appendix 
-.738 .443 .461 .658 
Employment- 
Part-time 
.232 See 
appendix 
See 
appendix 
-2.761 4.613 .006 .000 
Employment- 
Seasonal 
.114 See 
appendix 
See 
appendix 
-3.046 2.033 .002 .043 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 For coefficients for the employment regressions, consult the more detailed results in the appendices. 
The figures are very small and would require more space for decimal places.  
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Table Two: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
REALTAX/CP 486 165 1271 593.28 254.133 
REALCAPEXP 486 49.9460 1308.6866 325.402778 180.0667567 
REALPROCAP 486 .0000 159.7855 16.644511 16.4092202 
REALPLANDEVEL/CP 486 -.5586 286.1657 14.631258 28.3126908 
REALTRANSCAP/CP 486 -3.2519 450.0945 101.395780 60.2234324 
REALRECCULTURECAP 486 2.29066 685.66119 65.1211952 77.40048994 
EMP/CAP 478 .00363 .03500 .0132638 .00596681 
PARTTIMECAP 486 .0000 .0180 .003721 .0034497 
SEASONALCAP 486 .0000 .0150 .001868 .0022228 
Valid N (listwise) 478     
 
 
 The regression that examined the real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita 
had the highest explanatory value of any of the regressions that were conducted. The 
adjusted R-squared value of .607 shows that the explanatory and control variables were 
relatively powerful in explaining variation in the tax variable. The regression coefficient 
associated with the election year dummy variable was -23.842. This suggests that real 
own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is over $23 lower in election years. This 
corresponds to a t-value of 1.603 and is significant at the 11% level. With the exception 
of the regressions featuring employment variables as dependent, this is the highest 
degree of significance recorded for an explanatory variable in any of the regressions. 
While this result is not statistically significant at the standard 5% level, it is interesting for 
a number of reasons which will be discussed further in the analysis chapter. 
 The results from the regressions on capital variables held less explanatory power 
than the regression regarding taxes. However, the results are still interesting. With 
respect to the regression on total real capital expenditures per capita, the adjusted R-
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squared value was .14. The regression coefficient associated with the election year 
dummy variable was 8.795. This implies that in election years over $8 per person more 
is spent compared to other years. This corresponds to a t-value of 0.565, and is not 
statistically significant. However, the regression coefficient is in the right direction. 
 The regression on real transportation capital expenditures per capita had an 
adjusted R-squared of .104. The election year coefficient was 7.798, implying that 
almost $8 per person more is spent in election years compared to other years. This 
corresponds to a t-value of 1.432 and is significant at the 16% level. While not 
statistically significant, the regression coefficient is again in the hypothesized direction 
and there does appear to be some association that would be surprising if arising out of 
coincidence or bias.  
The regression on real recreation and culture capital expenditures per capita had 
an adjusted R-squared of .059. The election year coefficient was 6.116 which 
corresponds to a t-value of .84. This is not statistically significant, however, the 
regression coefficient is yet again in the hypothesized direction. 
The regression on real protection capital expenditures per capita had an adjusted 
R-squared of .035. The election year coefficient was 1.869 which corresponds to a t-
value of 1.205 and is significant at the 23% level. While not being statistically significant 
the regression coefficient is indeed in the hypothesized direction. 
The regression on real planning and development capital expenditures per capita 
had an adjusted R-squared of .025. The election year coefficient was -0.727 which 
corresponds to a t-value of -0.268. This is not statistically significant and the regression 
coefficient is not in the hypothesized direction, although it is only slightly negative. 
The regressions on employment variables hold more explanatory value than the 
regressions on capital expenditure variables. As well, generally the results hold more 
statistical significance. Regression coefficients will not be reported for employment 
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variables. They are all incredibly small as municipal employment per capita figures are 
minute to begin with. 
With respect to the regression on total municipal employment per capita the 
adjusted R-squared was .245. The t-value for the election year coefficient is -0.738. This 
is not in the hypothesized direction and is not significant. The t-value for the year before 
election dummy variable was 0.443. This is in the hypothesized direction and is not 
significant. 
The regression on part-time municipal employment per capita had an adjusted R-
squared of .232. The t-value for the election year variable was -2.761. This is not in the 
hypothesized direction and is significant at the 1% level. The t-value for the year before 
election year variable was 4.613. This is in the hypothesized direction and is significant 
at the 1% level. 
 The regression on seasonal municipal employment per capita had an adjusted R-
squared of .114. The t-value for the election year variable was -3.046. This is not in the 
hypothesized direction and is significant at the 1% level. The t-value for the year before 
election year variable was 2.033. This is in the hypothesized direction and is significant 
at the 5% level. 
The results from the municipal employment regressions were not as anticipated. 
However, they do feature an interesting result that, while not being initially hypothesized, 
can potentially be explained given other results.  
In summary, the regression coefficients for the election year variable were in the 
hypothesized direction for every variable with the exception of all of the employment 
variables, as well as real planning and development capital expenditures per capita. 
Interestingly, the hypothesized result was confirmed for the employment variables with 
respect to the year before election variable.  
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 A final interesting result concerns the correlation between real own purpose 
lower-tier taxation per capita and real capital expenditures per capita. These two 
variables have a Pearson correlation coefficient of .467. This correlation is positive which 
implies that these variables move in the same direction. As well, this correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. Of the 30 largest decreases in real own purpose lower-tier 
taxation per capita (as stated 27 of which occurred in 2006 an election year), 17 cases 
had real capital expenditures per capita also falling while 13 had that variable increasing. 
 Most of these results were not statistically significant, although some were 
substantially more significant than others. The most significant non-employment factor 
was real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita. This regression also had by far the 
highest adjusted R-squared on any of the regressions. However, some of the 
regressions on the employment variables led to findings which are significant at the 1% 
level. These results provide an ample amount of information to be analysed. 
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Chapter Five - Limitations 
 There are a number of issues that may be a threat to the validity of this research 
and limit the ability for generalizations to be made across the Ontario sample and to 
outside of this sample. 
 Causal issues are always an issue with any research. Correlations can be made, 
but it is always difficult to say with certainty that one thing leads to another. The study of 
political business cycles is no exception to this issue. As governments do not have 
perfect control over the economy, other factors may be driving the result. The limited 
understanding by politicians of economic problems and the lags in their ability to control 
the economy lead to scepticism by some that politicians could even create a political 
business cycle (Ginsburgh & Michel, 1983, 156). However, there exist no other 
explanations that would justify a systemic lowering of taxes by municipalities in election 
years, nor do explanations exist for higher capital spending or employment. Until an 
alternative explanation is given as to why these variables would systematically shift 
according to whether it is an election year or not, it should be believed that the election 
year is causing the politicians to make these choices if this result is found empirically. 
 The selection of the sample may lead to some issues in bias. It is possible that 
by leaving out small municipalities the selection may be biased in some way. However, 
as generalizations will not be made regarding small municipalities this is not an issue. 
Similarly, while the research at hand indicates what the case is for Ontario in the given 
years, generalizations outside of Ontario and the given years may not be entirely 
accurate. However, the results of this research will be applicable to the Ontario case 
unless something changes that would give reason to believe the situation faced by 
Ontario municipal politicians has been made substantially different.   
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 Maturation might be an issue within the selected sample. For instance, the 
Ontario ranges of fairness that limit increases to residential taxes may lead to more 
decreases in at least residential tax rates, and might be having an effect on own purpose 
lower-tier taxation that is biasing the numbers. However, this research examines total, 
not residential, taxes. Unless a valid reason is suggested, there appears no reason why 
this data should be biased in any way by natural changes occurring within Ontario’s 
municipalities. 
 There were a number of amalgamations or mergers that occurred in the sample 
over the relevant time period. While this has the potential to lead to issues of 
experimental mortality, the data was analysed in a way which did not present an issue 
for this research. 
 Issues with instrumentation may be possible if municipalities were not recording 
data in a consistent way. However, there are no large issues with respect to this that 
have come to attention. 
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Chapter Six - Analysis 
 The results obtained in the course of this research project suggest that there is 
some evidence for the existence of political business cycles in Ontario municipalities. 
Before the results of the regressions are analyzed, the results of the initial data 
examination will be discussed. 
Of the 30 largest negative annual changes in real own purpose lower-tier taxation 
per capita, 27 are from 2006. This indicates one of two things. It is possible that this 
indicates that the political business cycle exists as it appears that municipalities are 
lowering the amount of taxes that they are collecting for their own purposes in election 
years. However, the fact that 27 out of 30 are from one particular election year may 
indicate that there is some systemic change that led to many municipalities taking the 
same action in this year which just happened to be an election year. If this is the case 
then this systemic change may be driving the result that real own purpose lower-tier 
taxation per capita seems to be an important variable. Exactly what is going on here is 
not known, however, it certainly warranted mention. 
Of the 30 largest positive changes in real own purpose lower-tier taxation per 
capita, only five are from election years. As two of the six years for which change data is 
available studied are election years, this value would have been expected to be 10 in the 
absence of a political business cycle. This result, combined with the result that the vast 
majority of the 30 largest negative changes come from election years, indicates that 
political business cycles seem to be occurring. 
Of the 30 largest values for part-time municipal employees, 22 come from years 
before election years. Similarly for seasonal municipal employees, 20 of the top 30 
values come from years before election years. As only two of the seven years sampled 
are years before election years, the expected values would have been roughly 8.5 in the 
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absence of a political business cycle. This seems to indicate that something is occurring 
in the year before elections with regards to employment. However, as stated above the 
idea that politicians would try to strategically enhance their image in anticipation of a 
close election two years in the future is not an intuitively plausible scenario. The 
explanation that election year employment is kept artificially low to keep taxes low 
seems to make some intuitive sense. However, that explanation has little to say about 
why employment would be high in the year before elections. While the low employment 
in election years would make employment seem high in all other years, it should not 
have as drastic an effect on the year before elections as is being seen in the data. 
The regression coefficients were in the hypothesized direction in all cases with 
the exception of the employment variables and real planning and development capital 
expenditures per capita. The regression coefficient in the latter case was only slightly 
negative and not significant. As well, this regression had the lowest explanatory power of 
any of the regressions conducted. Thus, it seems safe to assume that those who wish to 
create a political business cycle do not attempt to manipulate planning and development 
in any substantial way, at least in the Ontario case. This result is interesting as it 
contradicts previous research findings. 
 Capital infrastructure projects such as roads and overpasses have been 
suggested as highly visible expenditures which are likely to be manipulated by politicians 
who wish to create a political business cycle for their own advantage (Veiga & Veiga, 
2007, 46). However, the results of this research indicate that transportation capital 
expenditure7 per capita is not significantly related to election years. However, there does 
appear to be some relationship and it is in the hypothesized direction. This weakly 
confirms the result that capital expenditures in highly visible areas are the most affected. 
However, this result is not as strong as it has been in previous studies. There are a 
                                                          
7 Transportation capital expenditures is the variable that would contain things such as roadways, etc. 
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number of reasons why this could be possible. It could be that the type of expenditures 
that are considered visible, or that are seen as positive by the public is different from 
place to place. Thus, it could be that in Portugal citizens see investment in roads and 
infrastructure as essential or valuable, whereas Ontario citizens see capital projects that 
have to do with infrastructure as causing excessive traffic problems and as a less 
valuable use of public funds. This is just a possible example; however the point is that 
what is considered visible and positive by the public likely changes in different contexts.   
 The fact that the regressions on employment variables led to the conclusion that 
municipal employment goes down in election years was surprising given the theory 
behind the political business cycle. However, a number of theories help to understand 
what might be driving this result. Crucial to the idea that there is a political business 
cycle is that employment was higher the year before elections. The result that real own 
purpose lower-tier taxation per capita was down in election years might also help to 
explain the result with respect to employment in election years.  
In election years if taxes are being manipulated to be artificially low, and capital 
expenditures are increasing slightly, these funds must come from somewhere. Cuts to 
employment or less hiring relative to other years could potentially be a tactic used by 
some politicians to help to contain costs in election years. As well, the fact that all types 
of employment are up in the year before elections implies that it is possible that 
politicians attempt to gain favour through higher employment the year before elections. 
However, there are some issues with parts of this explanation. It seems unlikely that a 
politician would know two years before an election in what state they would be regarded 
by the public come election time. The idea that political business cycles are started two 
years in advance by politicians who can predict what their situation will be like in the 
future is not an intuitively plausible scenario. However, this does not alter the first part of 
this argument which is that it appears that employment may be manipulated in Ontario 
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municipalities in election years, however the manipulation was different than originally 
hypothesized. It may be the case that employment is kept suppressed in election years 
and that this corresponds with artificially low real own purpose lower-tier taxation per 
capita. 
  While most of the regression coefficients are in the hypothesized direction, some 
explanations for how political business cycles are created are more believable given the 
data. As stated it certainly appears that real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is 
lower than would be expected in election years. The relative power of this regression 
and relative significance of the election year coefficient seem to confirm the theory that 
taxes are manipulated in election years in some places. The regression coefficient for 
election years is only significant at the 11% level. While this certainly is not proof that 
there is a political business cycle, it would be surprising to obtain this result out of sheer 
chance. As well, the theory of the political business cycle does not imply that election 
year manipulations will take place in every municipality in every election. This has been 
suggested as a reason why the political business cycle has been hard to empirically 
isolate. The regressions conducted for this research did not control for factors such as 
the closeness of the elections or whether or not incumbents were running for re-election. 
Political business cycle theory argues that having incumbents running for re-re-election 
in competitive races may be necessary to find evidence of a political business cycle. The 
reasons for this were mentioned in the initial exploration of political business cycle, 
however they bear re-mentioning.  
While policies that result in a political business cycle supposedly give some 
benefit to those that enact them, that benefit may be countered by a cost. If one is seen 
to be manipulating the economy for their own purposes this could lead to negative 
reactions by the public regarding that candidate (Schultz, 1995, 85). As politicians face 
decreasing returns to scale on the amount of votes that they get, this implies that the 
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incentive for politicians who are doing better in the polls to engage in the creation of a 
political business cycle is smaller than for those who face competitive races (Schultz, 
1995, 87). As well, if the incumbent politician is not running for re-election then the 
incentives to engage in the creation of a political business cycle are also quite different 
and these politicians should be less likely to lead to the creation of a political business 
cycle. For these reasons it is not expected that every municipality will have a political 
business cycle for every election year. Whether or not one is created depends on the 
interplay of many factors. This is why it should not be expected that extremely strong 
results will be obtained when looking for political business cycles. 
The correlation between real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita and real 
capital expenditures per capita should not be surprising as less taxation revenues imply 
less funds to spend on capital projects. Similarly, more taxation revenues imply more 
funds to spend on capital projects. However, political business cycle theory predicts that 
politicians who wish to appear more competent will lower taxes and raise capital 
expenditures in election years. However, the fact that these two variables are highly 
correlated implies that this may not be the case. As well, of the 30 largest annual 
decreases in real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita (of which 27 were from 
2006 an election year), real capital expenditures per capita were falling in 17 of those 
cases and rising in 13. This indicates an interesting result. Is seems as if politicians may 
strategically choose to affect either taxation or capital spending, depending on which will 
be considered more visible or positive by the public. It is possible that a politician who 
was seen to be decreasing taxes while engaging in a large amount of spending would be 
regarded as an irresponsible manager of the local public economy. Thus, politicians may 
choose to affect one variable or the other, however maybe not both at once.  
This result may seem to be unsupportive of the finding of a political business 
cycle. However, the fact that real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita is lower in 
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election years compared to other years and that capital expenditures are higher in 
election years, despite the fact that these two variables are highly correlated is a 
surprising result, and one which seems to indicate the presence of a political business 
cycle. 
Some who read this may wish for certain specific cases to be mentioned as 
possible municipalities where political business cycles were created. However, as stated 
above it can be difficult to imply causation from statistical analysis and to do so with a 
cursory look at data alone would be irresponsible. There certainly are cases where taxes 
are going down and capital expenditures are going up in election years. While cases 
where these values are going in different directions at magnitudes that could be 
considered irresponsible could be mentioned, to do so without more knowledge of each 
situation and exactly what the underlying causes were would be irresponsible. However, 
while this is the case, the results obtained from this study indicate that taxes are lower in 
election years compared to other years and capital expenditures are higher in election 
years. Without need to analyse specific cases, the results obtained in this research 
would be surprising if obtained by chance and there is an indication of political business 
cycles in Ontario municipalities.    
All of the above analysis indicates that there is some evidence for political 
business cycles in Ontario municipalities from 2000 to 2006. While the results are not 
statistically significant in most cases, the results seem to point in the direction of political 
business cycles occurring. As has been mentioned, the fact that this result is not overly 
strong or statistically significant should not be taken to mean that political business 
cycles are not occurring. Indeed, political business cycle theory would suggest that 
empirically it is difficult to find.  
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Chapter Seven - Implications for Theory 
 This study provides weak support for the existence of political business cycles in 
Ontario municipalities. This conclusion makes sense given the research that has come 
before it. Political business cycles are more likely to exist in younger democracies, and 
are not expected to occur in every municipality in every election. Thus weakly confirming 
the existence of political business cycles would seem to make theoretical sense.  
Future empirical research should focus on isolating exactly in what situations 
political business cycles can be expected, and in what situations they will not be 
expected. As has been stated previously, the current argument is that close elections 
with incumbents running for re-election are situations where political business cycles are 
most likely. However, the extent to which politicians know much in advance of elections 
whether they will be competitive and whether they will be running again is unclear. While 
these variables may be helpful in determining the likelihood of political business cycles, 
this is most likely not the entire explanation. 
Future theoretical research should focus on a problem that revolves around the 
budget constraint that many theoretical examinations of political business cycles use. In 
many cases a standard two period budget constraint of a set value is used (Baleiras & 
Santos, 2000, 123). However, the person who is said to face that budget constraint 
actually has the power to change the budget constraint. A set budget constraint may not 
be the most realistic budget constraint facing politicians. It is likely that an endogenous 
budget constraint would greatly complicate these models and that the results may very 
well be the same. Nevertheless, an endogenous budget constraint would be a more 
realistic depiction of the situation actually facing politicians who must make decisions of 
whether or not to engage in the creation of a political business cycle. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion 
 This essay began with an outline of the current state of political business cycle 
research. Following this a research model was set up, and the results of that research 
were reported. It appears that there is some evidence to support the notion that political 
business cycles do exist in Ontario municipalities. A number of directions for future 
theoretical and empirical research have also been suggested. Political business cycles 
affect democracy and the legitimacy that our democratic institutions hold. The legitimacy 
of our democratic institutions is essential to their proper functioning. Political business 
cycles are something that should be taken seriously, despite the fact that it can be 
difficult to come up with strong empirical results regarding their existence. 
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Appendix 
Regression – Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .783a .613 .607 156.862 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 50.843 205.748  .247 .805 
Election Year -23.842 14.877 -.047 -1.603 .110 
REALCANCOND 2.994 .580 .201 5.165 .000 
REALONTUNCOND -.339 .148 -.118 -2.286 .023 
REALONTCOND .718 .068 .613 10.620 .000 
Densqkm .033 .012 .095 2.751 .006 
Popu15 823.170 770.917 .071 1.068 .286 
Popo65 1991.128 475.786 .272 4.185 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: REALTAX/CP 
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Regression – Real capital expenditures per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .391a .153 .140 164.1985811 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -225.485 215.372  -1.047 .296 
Election Year 8.795 15.573 .025 .565 .573 
REALCANCOND .444 .607 .042 .733 .464 
REALONTUNCOND -.469 .155 -.230 -3.024 .003 
REALONTCOND .449 .071 .542 6.345 .000 
Densqkm .000 .013 .001 .019 .985 
Popu15 2055.569 806.974 .249 2.547 .011 
Popo65 891.970 498.039 .172 1.791 .074 
a. Dependent Variable: REALCAPEXP 
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Regression – Real protection services capital expenditures per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .224a .050 .035 16.3503158 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18.285 21.446  .853 .394 
Election Year 1.869 1.551 .055 1.205 .229 
REALCANCOND .114 .060 .115 1.883 .060 
REALONTUNCOND -.008 .015 -.040 -.502 .616 
REALONTCOND .012 .007 .151 1.670 .096 
Densqkm -.003 .001 -.117 -2.163 .031 
Popu15 33.206 80.356 .043 .413 .680 
Popo65 -66.632 49.593 -.137 -1.344 .180 
a. Dependent Variable: REALPROCAP 
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Regression – Real planning and development capital expenditures per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .199a .040 .025 28.6507889 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.579 37.580  .095 .924 
Election Year -.727 2.717 -.012 -.268 .789 
REALCANCOND .193 .106 .112 1.827 .068 
REALONTUNCOND .046 .027 .137 1.691 .091 
REALONTCOND -.009 .012 -.067 -.734 .463 
Densqkm .005 .002 .113 2.075 .039 
Popu15 -3.452 140.808 -.003 -.025 .980 
Popo65 49.500 86.902 .058 .570 .569 
a. Dependent Variable: REALPLANDEVEL/CP 
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Regression – Real transportation capital expenditures per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .343a .118 .104 57.4118072 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 18.443 75.304  .245 .807 
Election Year 7.798 5.445 .063 1.432 .153 
REALCANCOND .332 .212 .092 1.565 .118 
REALONTUNCOND -.039 .054 -.055 -.711 .478 
REALONTCOND .089 .025 .313 3.592 .000 
Densqkm .010 .004 .113 2.165 .031 
Popu15 349.408 282.157 .124 1.238 .216 
Popo65 -39.728 174.139 -.022 -.228 .820 
a. Dependent Variable: REALTRANSCAP/CP 
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Regression – Real recreation and culture capital expenditures per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .271a .074 .059 76.75846973 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, 
REALCANCOND, Densqkm, REALONTUNCOND, 
REALONTCOND, Popu15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -128.355 100.680  -1.275 .203 
Election Year 6.116 7.280 .038 .840 .401 
REALCANCOND -.338 .284 -.072 -1.193 .233 
REALONTUNCOND -.043 .073 -.047 -.589 .556 
REALONTCOND .007 .033 .019 .212 .832 
Densqkm .013 .006 .117 2.186 .029 
Popu15 891.270 377.239 .242 2.363 .019 
Popo65 140.634 232.820 .061 .604 .546 
a. Dependent Variable: REALRECCULTURECAP 
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Regression – Total employment per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .503a .253 .245 .00509383 
a. Predictors: (Constant), YrB4Election, Popu15, Densqkm, Election 
Year, Popo65 
 
 
  
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .034 .006  5.316 .000 
Election Year .000 .001 -.036 -.738 .461 
Densqkm 1.649E-6 .000 .203 4.716 .000 
Popu15 -.123 .024 -.450 -5.140 .000 
Popo65 .005 .015 .029 .323 .747 
YrB4Election .000 .001 .022 .443 .658 
a. Dependent Variable: EMP/CAP 
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Regression – Part-time employment per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .492a .242 .232 .0029675 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, Densqkm, 
Ont. Unemployment, YrB4Election, Popu15 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .000 .005   -.112 .911 
Election Year .000 .000 -.138 -2.761 .006 
YrB4Election .002 .000 .237 4.613 .000 
Ont. Unemployment .133 .040 .157 3.296 .001 
Densqkm 5.049E-7 .000 .108 2.487 .013 
Popu15 -.029 .014 -.187 -2.127 .034 
Popo65 .004 .009 .036 .403 .687 
a. Dependent Variable: PARTTIMECAP 
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Regression – Seasonal employment per capita 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .355a .126 .114 .0020604 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Popo65, Election Year, Densqkm, 
Ont. Unemployment, YrB4Election, Popu15 
  
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.004 .003   -1.251 .212 
Election Year .000 .000 -.164 -3.046 .002 
YrB4Election .001 .000 .112 2.033 .043 
Ont. Unemployment .088 .028 .161 3.142 .002 
Densqkm 1.435E-7 .000 .047 1.018 .309 
Popu15 .000 .010 .002 .026 .980 
Popo65 .001 .006 .009 .092 .927 
a. Dependent Variable: SEASONALCAP 
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Correlation – Real own purpose lower-tier taxation per capita and real capital expenditures per 
capita 
 
Correlations 
  REALTAX/CP REALCAPEXP 
REALTAX/CP Pearson Correlation 1 .467** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 486 486 
REALCAPEXP Pearson Correlation .467** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 486 486 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
